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Abstract: Reindeer herding in the Mackenzie Delta area started in March 1935, when 
a herd of 2,370 animals was delivered to the newly established Reindeer Grazing Reserve. 
Conceived to supplement the dwindling wildlife resources of the Canadian Arctic and to 
improve the economic conditions of the native Eskimos, the policy was to keep a 
government-owned nucleus herd from which additional units could be obtained and put 
under Eskimo management. Several native-owned herds were set up, but for various 
reasons they all were retumed to the government, the last one in 1964. A new approach 
was undertaken in 1960; in an attempt to demonstrate the economic feasibility of an 
Arctic reindeer industry, the project was placed under private management. There were 
plans to start large-scale reindeer breeding following modern conceptions of reindeer 
husbandry, but when the reindeer population dropped alarmingly, the Canadian Wildlife 
Service in 1968 accepted the responsibility for a five-year term. The main task then was 
to rebuild the herd and to conduct biological as well as management-related studies. In 
March 1974, the herd was finally sold to a native-owned Reindeer Company. In addition 
to providing a detailed review of reindeer herding in the Mackenzie Delta area, an 
attempt is made to evaluate the past economic importance of the project and to assess its 
potential future development. (The translation is by Williarn Barr, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.) 
1. Introduction 
The first attempt at introducing a reindeer industry, Le., the herding of 
semi-domesticated reindeer (Rangi[er tarandus), into North America was made in 
the 1890's in Alaska. In an effort to help the Eskimo, whose existence was 
threatened by the ruthless exploitation of the stocks of game by American whalers, 
1,280 reindeer were purchased in Siberia between 1891 and 1902 and were 
subsequently distributed over a wide area of coastal Alaska in the form of 
Eskimo-owned herds. The subsequent eventful history of this enterprise, to which 
the present 21 herds consisting of 29,000 animals provide eloquent testimony, has 
frequently been told (Lantis, 1950; Sonnen feld, 1959; Brady, 1968; Olson, 1969). 
The early Canadian attempts in this direction, all of which failed, have also 
been dealt with elsewhere (Treude, 1966; Scotter, 1972), and hence they need only 
to be touched upon here. Inspired by the successful development of the reindeer 
industry in Alaska, Dr. W. Grenfell, a missionary and physician, bought 300 animals 
in Norway in 1908 and subsequently introduced them to northem Newfoundland 
under the supervision of several Lapp families who accompanied the reindeer. His 
initial success stimulated the Canadian Department of the Interior to purchase 50 
animals from his herd and to ship them to Fort Smith on the N.W.T.·Alberta 
border. However, most of these animals died the following summer. Grenfell's 
attempt also foundered by 1923 because of a lack of suitable herders after the 
Lapps had returned horne and refusal of government support. 
Through the urgings of the explorer Dr. V. Stefansson, the Canadian 
Government set up a Royal Commission in 1919 to study the possibilities of 
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establishing a reindeer and muskox industry. Before the results of this investigation 
were published, Stefansson, on his own initiative in 1921, introduced 521 
Norwegian reindeer into southern Baffin Island. This attempt also failed because the 
fodder base turned out to be inadequate for an intensive herding operation and, 
despite the recruitment of Lapp herders, there was a lack of proper supervision of 
the animals. 
The Royal Commission published its report in 1921, and in contrast to 
Stefansson, who thought primarily in terms of the establishment of a reindeer 
industry aimed at the export of meat to southern Canada, it recommended the 
creation of a number of experimental herds in areas to be selected by scientists. The 
aims would be: to insure a supply of meat for the Eskimos and Indians, and skins 
necessary for the production of winter clothing; to create food reserves in the event 
of rnining exploitation in the North; and to lay the groundwork for the possible 
future establishment of a commercial reindeer industry aimed at the production and 
export of meat. Apart from Ungava and the west coast of Hudson Bay among 
others, the coastal zone between Kent Peninsula to the east of Bathurst Inlet and 
the Alaska-Yukon boundary was identified as a potential reindeer-herding area 
(Canada, 1972). 
Between 1926 and 1928, A. E. Porsild, a Danish scientist who later became 
chief botanist of the National Museum in Ottawa, conducted thorough field 
investigations in the area between the Alaska boundary in the west, the Coppermine 
River in the east, and Great Bear Lake in the south. His survey revealed that the 
northwestern part of the area alone would be capable of carrying 250,000 animals, 
while the area north of Great Bear Lake could support a further 300,000 reindeer. 
On this basis, and on orders from the government, Porsild studied reindeer stocks in 
Alaska and reconnoitered a route by which a herd might be driven to the Mackenzie 
Delta. In 1929 the Canadian Government bought 3,400 reindeer from Kotzebue 
Sound. Late in 1929 the great drive along the coast began. Not until five years 
later, in March 1935, did the Lapps and Eskimos accompanying the herd reach their 
destination on the east bank of the Mackenzie River with 2,370 animals. 
The present article traces the development of the Mackenzie Delta project 
during the intervening 40 years, discusses both the setbacks suffered and the results 
achieved, and assesses the possibilities for future development. 
2. The Background Situation 
The general development of the reindeer industry in the Mackenzie Delta can 
be understood only against the background of overall economic changes in the area. 
The starting point would be the period dominated by commercial whaling: from 
1889 onward American whalers wintered regularly off the Delta. The critical aspect 
in this connection is not so much the fact that the Eskimos r'lrticipated in whaling, 
a new activity for them, or that they manned some of the small whaleboats that 
the whalers brought with them, as that they undertook to supply fresh meat for the 
crews. Mter the introduction of the rifle, this hunting activity led to the 
annihilation, or at least to a significant reduction, of the stocks of game over a wide 
radius, particularly the stocks of caribou. This can perhaps be better understood 
when one considers that on Herschellsland alone, during some winters an additional 
600 Americans had to be fed (Usher, 1971). From the beginning, the whalers 
augmented their income by setting traps throughout the winter and also by 
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Fig.1. The Mackenzie Reindeer Grazing Reserve, N.W.T. 
encouraging the Eskimos to do so, so that a trade in furs quickly developed, 
together with a growing dependence on imported goods. As a result, the failure of 
the whalers to return after the collapse of the whaIebone market in 1907 shook the 
economic base of the Eskimo groups who had come into contact with them. But 
the establishment of trading posts immediately after this period offered an 
opportunity for intensifying trapping activities. A number of furbearing species were 
trapped in the delta, predominantly muskrat, while on the co ast it was exclusively 
Arctic fox. The yield from trapping depended on two factors: the cyclical 
fluctuations in the stocks of the animaIs trapped, and movements in worId market 
prices. The 1920's saw a boom in the fur trade and relative prosperity for the 
Eskimos until, as a result of the worId economic depression, the price collapsed. 
With the recruiting of Lapp herders, the setting aside of a reindeer reserve of 
17,094 km2 (expanded to 46,361 km2 in 1952) to the east of the Mackenzie, where 
all types of hunting, except trapping, were prohibited, and with the establishment 
of. the settlement of Reindeer Depot (later renamed Reindeer Station) for the 
families of the reindeer herders, the necessary prerequisites were created. 
The reserve was delimited in such a way that, in accordance with fodder 
requirements, it included parts of two vegetation zones: the flat, relatively wet 
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Arctic tundra in the north, with grasses ans sedges, as weIl as dwarf shrubs and 
lichen carpets on drier sites was suitable for summer pasture; the forest tundra in 
the south, with its more pronounced relief and its open park-like woodland with 
black spruce, white spruce and birch, interspersed with wide level areas colonized 
only by lichens, provided optimal winter pasture. OnIy in the extreme southeast 
does this forest tundra give way to denser boreal evergreen forests. The intermediate 
transition zone, with low birch and willow scrub, was to serve as intermediate 
grazing, Le., as spring grazing (and calving grounds) and as fall grazing (see Fig. I). 
The government's program of development envisaged that a permanent herd of 
about 4,000 animals would be maintained in the reserve. It was calculated that ,ihis 
main herd would increase annually by 400 caives, which would make it possible to 
remove 700 to 900 animals regularly every second year, and to hand them over to 
suitable Eskimos as independent units. At the same time the new herders would be 
obliged, after an appropriate period, to return to the main herd half of the number 
originally entrusted to them, so that here, too, there would be anirnals available for 
estabfishing further herds. Furthermore the main herd was to be used to familiarize 
interested Eskimos with the techniques of reinderr herding, the more expert Lapps 
acting as teachers. At the same time it was also to be used to supply the meat and 
skin requirements of the immediate vicinity, to the extent that this was possible 
without reducing the growth of the herds. 
It can no longer be determined with any degree of certainty, whether it was 
originally planned to entrust the Lapps with complete responsibility for the project. 
The government appointed as superintendent a Eurocanadian without any previous 
experience in reindeer herding; apart from direct responsibility for the main herd 
and for the training program associated with it, he was also to exercise control over 
the Eskimo-owned herds that were to be set up. He, in turn, was bound by 
directives that he received from an Interdepartmental Reindeer Committee within 
the then Department of Mines and Resources in Ottawa, which did not restrict itself 
simply to issuing general guidelines. This was an aspect that over the years was to 
have a negative effecL 
3. The Build-up of Eskimo-Owned Herds 
Within a few years the main herd had increased to the point where, in 
December 1938, 950 reindeer could be separated and transferred to the Anderson 
River, outside the reserve. These animals formed Herd 1, under the management of 
two experienced Eskimo herders, father and son. Herd 2 was established on the 
Horton River in December 1940 (Table 1). In anticipation of an expansion of the 
project eastward as far as the Coronation Gulf area, young Eskimos were recruited 
from that area to be trained by the Lapps as herders in the main herd. But in the 
summer of 1944 this undertaking, which had begun so promisingly, received a 
severe setback when the owners of the two newly formed herds drowned in a 
boating accidenL Whatever animals of the two herds could be found were combined 
and were operated thereafter as the Anderson River Herd, under government control 
(Fig. 2). 
During World War II it was difficult to recruit additional herders because of the 
high prices being paid for furs, but this situation changed after the war, at least 
briefly, as fur prices dropped. The Eskimos' interest in reindeer herding rose because 
they realized that this activity could also afford an opportunity, through the sale of 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Reindeer Separated from and Returned to the Main Herd in 
Connection with the Establishment of Eskimo-owned Units 
Separated Retumed Year Herd 
given up Animals Year Animals Year 
No. 1 950 1938 } '\11,300 
1944 1944 
No. 2 825 1940 (1950) 
No. 1 878 1948 400 1953 
No. 1 1,351 1953 15 1956} 1957 No. 2 1,099 1950 549 1954 
No. 3 827 1952 '\1400 1956 1956 
No. 4 1,302 1954 651 1964 1964 
7,032 3,315 
meat, for securing a cash income, with which they could purchase goods to which 
they had become accustomed. 
The procedure for further transfers of Eskimo-owned herds provided that, after 
a fairly lang training period, two Eskimos would together be entrusted with the 
management of each herd. The contract was set at five years (or could be extended 
if necessary) and it specified thai the new herd would be fully released from 
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10000,------------------------------------------------------~~IDOO 
8 000 t-------~~ 'Y.;.1---------II'i11-------------------1 1-----+8.000 
6.000 +-___ '#{""~L< 
4.000 
2 000 
i Mo;n h.,d (.;nc. 1935) H.,d 1 (1938-1944) H.,d 2 (1940-1944) Anderson River Herd (amalgamation of h.rd.l and 2). H.,d 2 (1949-1955) 
1------+ 6DOO 
I H.,d 1 (1948·1955) H.,d 3 (1952·1956) :: H.,d 4 (1954-1964) Amalgamation of herd. land 2 (1955-1957) 
4.000 
2.000 
Fig. 2. Number of reindeer in the different herds of the Mackenzie reindeer 
project during summer roundups, 1935-73. 
Source: Reports of Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa. 
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government ownership only when half the number of animals originally transferred 
was returned to the main herd after a minimum period of three years. Another 
stipulation was that the Eskimo·owned herd be we11 managed. For its part the 
government assumed the obligation for the maintenance of the two herders during 
the first year, supplying them with fuel and fishing nets and with assistance in 
building roundup corrals, and marketing meat not required for their own 
consumption. The government also bore the total costs for two assistants for a 
period of two (or, in special circumstances, three) years. The herders were to be 
permitted to slaughter a sniall number of animals for the first time during the 
winter fo11owing the establishment of their herd. In light of developments in AlaSka, 
the contract also specified that a11 sales from a herd required the approval of the 
government. (In spite of legal regulations, the reindeer in AlaSka had been 
transferred, after 1914, through the Lapp instructors into the hands of 
Euro-Americans. A new phase thus began: reindeer companies emerged, open 
her ding was introduced, and the grazing areas of the Eskimo-owned herds became 
intolerably constricted by those of the Euro-Americans. In view of the difficulties 
that arose from the mixing of herds, many Eskimos abandoned reindeer herding. 
The general confusion was not ended untU 1939 when the government bought out 
all 40 non-Eskimo herd owners.) 
In the Canadian case, Herd 1 was set up in December 1948. But when a gradual 
decrease in the number of animals occurred in subsequent years, the herd was 
dissolved in January 1953. The remaining reindeer (ab out 400 head) were returned 
to the government; the herd was then augmented to 951 animals and handed over 
to two other Eskimos as a new Herd 1. In February 1950, Herd 2 was created from 
the Anderson River Herd, after the latter had been moved back closer to the main 
herd (cf. Fig. 2). By March 1954 the managers of this herd had returned the 
number of animals prescribed according to the contract, whereupon, in June 1955, 
the Minister then in office confirmed their ownership of the herd, for a short time 
at least. Canada thus had its first truly Eskimo-owned herd. Then, in the summer of 
1955, it became apparent that both Herd 1 and Herd 2 had relapsed to a size that 
made their continued existence questionable. The two herds were amalgamated to 
enhance efficiency and reduce costs, and thereafter were managed by the owners of 
Herd 2. In the summer of 1956, one of the owners wanted to give up his 
partnership, whereupon his partner bought him out; but in the fo11owing year the 
latter also gave up, on grounds of age. A progressive decline in herd size was also a 
contributing factor. The government bought back the remaining animals. Herd 3 
evolved in February 1952; but two years later one of the managers resigned, 
followed in 1956 by the other; the remains of the herd were returned to the main 
herd. Herd 4 was formed in March 1954 and survived for 10 years, until personal 
relations between the two herders, who were from Victoria Island, deteriorated to 
the point that they decided to dissolve the partnership and to break up the herd. 
TItey gave back the prescribed number of animals, sold 390 to the government, and 
slaughtered 220. Whether even this herd would have survived this long without the 
constant influence exerted by the superintendent is doubtful. In any event, the 
formation of herds 5 and 6, envisaged for the spring of 1955, did not occur. 
By 1956, the government had recognized that its plan to insure a 
comprehensive economic base for the Eskimo over wide areas of the Canadian 
Arctic through the formation of Eskimo-owned herds was doomed to failure, 
although at this point there existed two small herds apart from the main herd. 
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Sourees: Krebs, 1961; Hill, 1967; Nowosad, 1972; Reports ofDept. ofIndian 
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In trying to identify causes for this failure, in the first instance, one has to seek 
an explanation for the drastic reduction in the numbers of reindeer in everyone of 
the herds taken over by Eskimos, leading in every case, without exception, to the 
abandonment of the herd. The causes would include inadequate supervision of the 
herds and associated losses by straying, excessive slaughter of animals, in part the 
grazing of the herds on unsuitable land, and overgrazing in the vicinity of the 
settlements, quite apart from losses by illness, predation, and poaching (cf. Fig. 3). 
As will be demonstrated later, the number of missing, i.e., strayed, animals over 
the course of a year corresponded approximately to that of the animals slaughtered. 
If the number of animals was to be maintained or increased, the losses from 
straying had to be kept at the lowest possible level since relatively intensive 
cropping of the herd was necessary to cover the fIXed costs associated with herding. 
Since operating costs (wages of the herd owner and assistants, minor repairs to 
equipment, etc.) ran at around $7,000 per year, as was the case for Herd 4 in 1963, 
then 175 animals would have to be slaughtered, at $40 per head, to cover these 
operating costs alone. At least 25 animals would be needed, in addition, for horne 
consumption. If one includes a further 175 reindeer that can be assumed to have 
strayed, the annual decrease would run at 475 animals at the minimum. With an 
average calf crop for the period 1938-58 of 28% (Krebs, 1961), the herd size 
would thus have to be in excess of 1,250 animals to produce the required annual 
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growth. However, the minimwn herd size would have to be 1,500 animals since a 
considerable number of the animals slaughtered would be cows. This meant that, 
even at the time of formation, the Eskimo herds were too small, and that the 
owners of a herd had to give up as soon as the numbers dropped below this critical 
threshold. In the case of the main herd, these considerations did not apply; since it 
was more of a demonstration herd, slaughtering could be postponed in the interest 
of an equable increase in stocks. 
Apart from these external difficulties, ansmg more from technical and 
economic causes, internal weaknesses in the area of interpersonal relations also 
contributed to the failure of the concept of an Eskimo-owned herd. The 
owner-partnerships evolved as a rule from adecision arrived at through government 
channels and did not reflect the personal preferences of the Eskimos. The old form 
of cooperation based on the family was ignored in favor of a partnership formed on 
the basis of the principle of maximwn possible efficiency. In most cases, the basis 
of trust, so necessary for success, was lacking, a circumstance that, combined with 
uncertainties as to competence in the areas of decision-making and leadership, led to 
a paralysis of that feeling of satisfaction in the job on the part of those involved, 
which undoubtedly initially existed. 
The intensive or elose method of herding introduced into Canada by the Lapps 
demanded that the herd be kept constantly under observation; a herder cireled 
around it with his herding dog at least once a day. In view of the elose proximity 
of the herds, this labor-intensive form of reindeer herding was unavoidable; yet, 
despite the demands it made on the herders, it was unable to halt the severe losses 
by straying. The difficulty and monotony of the work and. the comparatively low 
cash yield allowed reindeer herding to compete only to a limited degree with 
trapping or with wage labor. As long as there were no compelling reasons, as 
emerged immediately after World War 11, the majority of Eskimos were unwilling to 
exchange the unfettered traditional life of a hunter or trapper for that of a 
herdsman or herd owner. The Mackenzie Delta, because of a richness of species, 
offered particularly favorable conditions for trapping; indeed it is probably the most 
productive fur-trapping area of the entire Canadian Arctic. It was not without 
reason that some had warned, from the beginning, against selecting the delta for the 
experiment since the most prosperous Eskimos lived in that area. The period of the 
drop in fur prices was followed, in the early fifties, by a building boom associated 
with. the establishment of the DEW Line and the construction of the town of 
Inuvik. This quickly resulted in the more active Eskimos, who might have become 
involved in the reindeer industry, being lured elsewhere. 
Although an economic transformation affecting the entire region could not be 
achieved, a cadre of 10-15 Eskimos was nevertheless recruited and became firmly 
associated with the project. In the case of a relatively small number of Eskimos, it 
had thus been possible to make conscientious, responsible herders out of Arctic 
hunters, for whom hunting and trapping still remained ancillary occupations. 
However, the Eskimo herd owners did not evolve into modern entrepreneurs, intent 
on maximizing profits, but remained generally constrained by their hereditary 
modes of thoughts and value systems. Despite its market orientation, the newly 
introduced reindeer industry was viewed as an extension of traditional economic 
patterns. In the case of the herd owners, for example, the obligation to give away 
meat, based on the old system of insurance through reciprocity, still applied, despite 
the fact that wage employees, with their cash income, were exempt from it. This 
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circumstance was extremely a' ... ntageous in terms of the status of the herd owner, 
but extremely detrimental to I 3 economic situation. 
4. Continuation .Jj the Project on a Contract Basis 
Since 1956 the government in Ottawa had been seeking a solution to the dismal 
situation already outlined. Several possible courses of action were discussed over the 
next few years: (1) abandonment of the project, Le., cease herding the reindeer and 
let them go off with the caribou herds; (2) transfer of the herds to the Lapps who 
had stayed in the area, with freedom to proceed according to their own discretion; 
(3) transfer of responsibility for the project within the structure of government; (4) 
application of the total energies of the planners within the Department to 
impro ement of the herd management; (5) transfer of herd management for a 
limited period to experts, with the aim of determining the economic viability of 
reindeer her ding in the Mackenzie Delta. 
Since reindeer stocks reached their lowest level in 1958 (cf. Fig. 2), the 
decision as to future utilization of the reindeer could not be postponed. Despite a 
recommendation from the Reindeer Advisory Committee to transfer the herd to the 
Canadian Wildlife Service for a program of reorganization and research with a 
five·year time limit, the Department accepted an offer from John Teal, Director of 
the Institute of Northern AgricuItural Research in Vermont, and in the fall of 1960 
concluded a five-year contract with Teal and with A. J. Oeming, owner of agame 
farm in Alberta, with the aim of demonstrating the economic viability of reindeer 
herding. The government conceded that it would continue to cover the support 
costs that had been paid annually until then, but also secured for itself a share of 
the income anticipated from the sale of meat; at the same time the herd remained 
under government ownership. The speed with which Ottawa shifted the burden of 
responsibility to private individuals led to the contract being signed before the new 
partners could discuss their partly conflicting ideas as to goals; while Teal intended 
to pursue a reindeer industry directed toward maximum meat production, Oeming's 
interest lay more in experiments at interbreeding reindeer and caribou as weIl as in 
the supply of animals for his animal export business. The incompatibilities and 
divergences, in part predicted by experts within the Department, led to Oeming's 
retraction in June 1961, whereupon Teal attempted unsuccessfully to fmd a new 
Canadian partner. The general confusion in Ottawa continued until March 1963 
when Oeming secured a two-year contract, again with an assurance of continuation 
of the annual government subsidy. Oeming then hired Swedish-born S. B. Johansson 
as a project manager who seemed to have experience of reindeer herding and agreed 
to reorganize and modernize the project. 
When the final Eskimo-owned herd disappeared with the abandonment of Herd 
4, the first step was to replace the intensive or elose system of herding, which in 
Johansson's view overtaxed the vegetation cover and led to the animals being 
constantly disturbed, by an extensive or open system of herding. With this new 
form of herding, the reindeer would be permitted to graze unrestricted over a wide 
area; the herders confmed their activities to driving the herds during seasonal 
migrations. Otherwise they patrolled only occasionally around the grazing grounds 
to turn back straying reindeer and to counter poaching. In an effort to simplify 
and, at the same time, improve herd management, planes were widely used for the 
first time. At the same time, a horseshoe-shaped pattern of movement was 
introduced in place of the previous SE-NW migration. The new pattern was dictated 
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in part by signs of overgrazing on Richards Island, the traditional summer grazing 
area of the former main herd (Fig. 1). . 
Oeming's contract was not renewed in March 1965; his place was takeo by 
Johansson, who during his two years as project manager appeared to have proved 
his competence. However, his contract ran for only one year at a time, and was 
renewed for the last time in March 1967. In contrast to his predecessors, he 
received a fixed salary, Le., he did not enjoy a percentage interest in the sale of 
meat, and hence had no personal ioterest in excessive slaughtering. 
In 1964, Johansson had presented a development program which, after some 
modifications in the herd structure (cows were to make up about 90% of stocks), 
envisaged a growth of the herd to 30,000 animals within four years; during the 
same period almost 5,000 animals were to be slaughtered. With Johansson a 
previously unknown vocabulary made its appearance in government documents: 
technical ranching terms such as grazing density, optimal slaughter weight, meat 
production in Ibs. per unit of labor input; production costs per Ib. of meat, etc. 
These did not fail to make an impression on the officials in Ottawa. However, what 
was particularly important for the Department was that the day seemed to be not 
too distant when the project would not only support itself, but even promised to 
produce some profit. In a study carried out on the government's behalf (HilI, 1967) 
Joh,ansson's proposals were modified (the maximum stocks of 30,000 animals would 
not be reached until after 10 years, but to achieve that level about 65,000 reindeer 
were to be slaughtered du ring that lO-year period) and were expanded by the 
addition of an optimistic market study. 
However, all these plans came to naught when, in accordance with its 
supervisory obligations laid down in the contract, the government insisted on 
another herd census; the last one, taken in 1962, had indicated stocks of 7,634 
animals. Since then the size of the herd had been determined by using projections 
of empirical values for increases and losses. In March 1967, the reindeer stocks had 
been estimated at 9,057 animals, but in the fall of that same year an aerial photo 
survey revealed only 2,756 animals. One can only surmise the reasons for this 
discrepancy of more than 6,000 animals: the original herd size was probably smaller 
than estimated, and the number of strayed animals undoubtedly larger. Johansson's 
contract was not renewed and, in March 1968, the government was faced with the 
same problems as in 1960. 
On ce again a range of alternatives was discussed in Ottawa: that the herd be 
abandoned and hunting permitted; that another, more successful contractor be 
found; that responsibility for the herd be transferred to the Canadian Wildlife 
Service, to the Government of the Northwest Territories, or to some other 
govemment department; or that the surviving reindeer be slaughtered, the meat sold, 
and af least the usable equipment salvaged. 
For political reasons there could be no question of slaughtering the herd; one 
would have to reckon with strong protests from the residents of the delta; moreover 
the territorial government had expressed itself in favor of maintaining the herd. Nor 
could there by any question of continuing on a contractual basis, involving a private 
individual, since it was calculated that at least five years would be required to bring 
the herd back to economically viable size. Since it was believed that the reduction 
in herd numbers could be attributed to poor management by the contractor, it was 
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decided in Ottawa that it would be inappropriate to abandon the reindeer industry 
without having at least made an attempt to emphasize those aspects that bad been 
neglected during the previous 35 years. As of April 1, 1968, the project was 
therefore transferred to the Canadian Wildlife Service with a mandate to determine 
conclusively whether a continuation was either reasonable or practicable (the 
original two-year contract was extended by three years in 1970). 
The research plans presented by the Wildlife Service broke down into two 
groups. The first part, leaning more heavily toward biological investigations, focused 
on the growth and composition of the herd as weIl as optimal herd size, on the 
basis of purely biological aspects. In the second part of the program, directed to 
herd management, it was intended to bring the herd up to an optimal size, 
determined by the carrying capacity of the pastures, and to eliminate avoidable 
sources of loss. To facilitate the investigation, 166 km2 of land was to be fenced in 
and part of the herd would be placed in this area for investigation under model 
conditions. As a complement to the Wildlife Service project, extensive botanical 
studies were also pJanned. However, inadequate finances prevented the recruitment 
of staff and, in combination with an unexpected bureaucratic dispute between the 
new manager, R. F. Nowosad, and his supervisors in Edmonton, this had the effect 
of going back to a minimal program that yielded disappointing results and proved 
inconclusive as evidence. 
With the Wildlife Service assuming management of the herd, the settlement of 
Reindeer Station was abandoned, and the headquarters was moved to the 
government-owned research laboratory in Inuvik. 
The fact that the herd recovered relatively quickly and straying losses were 
reduced to a tolerable level can be ascribed onJy to Nowosad's personal influence; 
instead of the previous eight herders, now only four were available. Nowosad 
continued to implement the open herding system of his predecessors and even made 
it more extensive. At the same time, he reduced the degree to which the animals 
were driven by the herders in spring and fall, and permitted the herd to follow its 
natural migratory drive to a greater degree; at the same time, he implemented a 
rotation of winter grazings at the suggestion of the herders. The route of the herd, 
which diverges from the earlier horseshoe-shaped movement (cf. Fig. 1) resulted 
from the fact that, on the whole, in springtime the animals travel across the ice of 
the chain of lakes running through the reserve in a W-E direction, while in fall, 
when the lakes are still open, they migrate around them. Herding would 
undoubtedly have been made easier by the use of dogs, but, presumably because 
their use was associated with the earlier failures, Edmonton had prohibited their 
use, without consultation with the herders. 
In 1971 the discussions in Ottawa as to the future of the reindeer industry 
were renewed, with consideration of some additional alternatives: the herd was to 
be driven east so that the reindeer could join the caribou population in the 
Anderson River area; the restrietions .on hunting in the reserve were to be lifted, 
and an open season on the reindeer declared~ regulated hunting, involving even 
trophy hunters, was to be perm itted , under the supervision of the territorial 
government; all the animals were to be slaughtered, an operation that would" have to 
be extended over aperiod of three or four years in view of the limited consumption 
capacity of the local market; the herd was to be kept in its present condition, so 
that it might be available in case same demand might arise some time in the future; 
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the herd was to be allowed to grow to 30,000 animals and a profit-making reindeer 
industry was to be inaugurated along the lines of the plans presented by Johansson; 
or, finally, the herd was to be offered for sale, with the inhabitants of the delta 
receiving first refusal. 
Parallel with the biological research schemes of the Wildlife Service, 
investigations were also started in 1970 on the socioeconomic aspects of the 
reindeer industry; areport was completed in 1972, hut was not released. The 
recommendations, which were made available, called for the sale of the herd to an 
Eskimo, a suggestion that Ottawa was only too glad to seize. On March 20, 1974, 
the government sold 5,100 reindeer for $45,000 to the Canadian Reindeer Company 
Ltd., a Iimited liability joint-stock company in Tuktoyaktuk. The president and 
manager of the company is S. Kangegana, an Eskimo with experience in the 
reindeer operation. As part of the sales agreement, the company guaranteed that it 
would maintain minimum stocks of 3,000 animals; if the population dropped below 
that level, the government would have the opportunity of buying back the animals 
at a price of no more than $10 per head. Moreover, in the event of the herd being 
given up, the government would have first refusal on purchasing it. The company 
was obIiged to carry out annual roundups at government cost to determine the total 
number of animals, and, until the purchase price had been completely paid off, to 
provide the government, on request, with up to 1,000 cows at $10 per head insofar 
as this was possible, in the view of the zoologists, without affecting the growth of 
the herd. These animals could then be used by the government to build up further 
herds as required. The company is advised by a committee that includes a 
geographer from British Columbia who is the author of the study that provided the 
impulse for the sale of the herd, and representatives of the federal government, the 
territorial government, and of the settlements of Tuktoyaktuk and Inuvik. 
5. The Economic Signi[icance o[ the Project 
The aim of the original reindeer project started in the Mackenzie Delta in 1935 
was to place the crisis-shaken Eskimo economy on a new and secure basis through 
the establishment of Eskimo-owned herds; for a number of reasons this plan has not 
been implemented. The government then sought to determine the viability of a 
reindeer . industry directed toward meat production, also unsuccessfully. Despite 
these failures, the contributions that the project has made in improving the 
economic situation of the Eskimos should not be overlooked. That contribution has 
taken two forms: the provision of jobs and the supply of meat to a fairly wide 
section of the population. 
From the start of the operation untU 1953 a total of 120 Eskimos received tr~ining as herders for periods varying from a fe~ days to several years; by 1975, 
this number may have increased to about 200. In this connection no account is 
taken of the large number of Eskimos who have been employed for a short period 
: tem'p0rary helpers du~g the .annual reindeer roundup. In 1953,21 Eskimos lived c!uSJvel~. from the remdeer mdustry, either as herders or herd managers; with thel~ famUles the total would be 83 persons. In 1963, 70-80 Eskimos at Reindeer St~tl0n ~d a ~u~er .19 connected with Herd 4 reported the. reindeer operation as 
being thel~ mam hvelihood (Abrahantson, 1963). With the change to extensive or 
open herding. these numbers gradually declined until during the period when the 
herd was managed by the Wildlife Service, only four herders were required. 
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Remuneration to the herders of the main herd was made in the form of money 
and a meat ration. In the 1930's, the annual salary was $840 for herders and $300 for 
trainees, together with 12 reindeer per man; after the Wildlife Service took over the 
project, the herders received $6,800, but, at the same time, the meat aIlocation was 
discontinued. The cash incomes of the managers and of the Es~o herd owners in the 
1950's and 1960's ran between $5,500 and $7,000 per herd per year; tbis meant that, 
with two managers and two herders employed by them, salaries were about 
$1,500-1,800 far a manager, and $900-1,200 for aherder. 
On top of these payments, there was a special dispensation in the case of the main 
herd, a payment of 30-50g for every calf that was ear-marked. Not untill958, when 
there was a general increase in salaries, were these payments to the herders 
discontinued. 
During the period 1935-57, according to official data, a total of 12,054 reindeer, 
or 28.6% of the total herd increment, was slaughtered; at an average weight of 55 kg of 
meat per carcass, 662,970 kg of meat was thus made available to the Eskimo 
population. A further 6,872 animals (16.3%) fell prey to disease or predators. A total 
of 13,275 reindeer (31.5%) were recorded as having strayed, i.e., losses by straying 
exceeded the number slaughtered. In terms of annual average ftgures, the following 
picture is revealed: a reduction of 8.2% by slaughtering and 4.1% due to naturallosses 
(disease, predation) compared with 8.9% due to straying. Until1966 the known losses 
from slaughtering, disease and predators amounted to 28,263 animals, and the losses 
due to straying, to 28,846 animals. If one applies the percentage breakdown 
determined for the period 1935-57, a total of 18,004 animals would thus have been 
slaughtered up until 1966-a ftgure that appears entirely realistic-and they would have 
produced 990,220 kg of meat. When one includes the year 1967, for which no reliable 
data are available, as we11 as the period covered by the Wildlife Service's management, 
the total meat yields for the reindeer project would thus be in excess of 1 million kg. 
The weight of the slaughtered reindeer carcasses varies signiftcantly depending on 
age, sex, and condition of the animals. Herre (1955) has pointed out that total body 
weights are signiftcantly higher in North American reindeer than those from Eurasia, 
and that this average weight approaches the maximum weight for Lappish animals. The 
view, which one encounters frequently in government documents, that the average 
weight of slaughtered reindeer carcasses has decreased over the years should not be 
accepted without critical assessment. According to these sources, the weight of old 
buIJs in the early 1940's was around 77 kg and that of cows 60 kg; in 1947 the mean 
weight of both was recorded as 57 kg; while, since the 1950's, 55 kg per animal has 
been generally accepted. 
There may be two conceivable reasons for tbis development: ftrst, the intensifted 
slaughtering of young, immature bulls to meet the growing demand for meat; second, 
the fact that at least during the ftrst few years the strongest bulls were regularly 
castrated because the Lapps considered them dangerous; as a result, only the weaker, 
more docHe animals were aHowed to breed. 
Fairly accurate data on the distribution of the meat are available only for the 
period 1935 to 1955. According to these data, of the 9,083 reindeer slaughtered until 
1955, 45% were sold and 34% were consumed in the herding camps. Prior to 1953 a 
further 20% was distributed to the mission schooIs and hospitals in Aklavik, and 1 % 
was given away in the form of social welfare to needy Eskimos. For the period 
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1955-75, it can be estimated that 70% of the yield from the annual kill was available 
to be marketed. 
Until 1952 the me at was sold directly to private individuals, although it never 
completely met the demand; thereafter a marketing plan was introduced, whereby, 
apart from sales to the missions in Aklavik, the Hudson's Bay Company with its widely 
branching network of trading establishments on the Lower Mackenzie became 
established as the sole wholesale dealer. In 1959 some thought had to be given to 
introducing buffalo meat in addition, since a bottleneck had developed in the supply 
of meat from the delta. The following year the cost price rose from 35~ to 50~ per Ib., 
and thereby the selling price immediately rose to 65 to 82~ per Ib., depending on the 
type of meat. This made the purehase of the meat by members of the lowest income 
groups-and very many Eskimos come into that category-temporarily impossible 
(Abrahamson, 1963). Irrespective of the location at which slaughtering was carried 
out, the Eskimo herd managers received a standard price: the meat was flown out and 
the transport costs were averaged out. As a rule the annual slaughter took place in late 
November or December when, due to the prevailing low temperatures, the use of 
freezers was rendered unnecessary; however, summer slaughtering was also carried out 
quite frequently at the end of the roundups. 
Summer slaughtering in early August has the advantage that the skins, especially 
calf skins, can be used for the production of a wide range of winter clothing and boots, 
while those resulting from winter slaughtering can at best be used for sleeping robes. 
Since the remarkable decline in caribou stocks, there has been a shortage of the 
skins required for clothing and sleeping robes over wide areas of the Canadian Arctic. 
To alleviate this need, between 1942 and 1957 the Mackenzie Delta project was able 
to provide 4,647 skins for shipment to various settlements in the eastern Arctic. Prior 
to 1942, the skins were left on the carcasses to reduce spoilage during storage in 
ice cellars in the permafrost. 
Reindeer were trained as draft animals in small numbers; in the main herd alone 
60-70 geldings were regularly used for moving camp or for hauling firewood. 
However, for travel, sledge dogs remained indispensable until they were replaced in the 
1960's by snowmobiles. 
The high rate of lass by straying (it can be assumed that the majority of the 
animals wandered eastward out of the preserve and joined the local carib.ou herds) has 
repeatedly been the cause of concern ever since the start of reindeer herding in the 
delta. In this connection it can be accepted that inadequate attention by herders is 
only a partial cause. If one is to believe the reports in the official documents, the 
rnajority of the animals disappeared during periods of bad weather in late fall and 
winter, when orderly herding was not feasible in any case. In 1955 the superintendent 
suggested the buHding of fences to halt the losses by straying, at least in part. Then, in 
1957, British and Scandinavian reindeer experts also advocated the erection of a fence 
from Reindeer Depot eastward; moreover, they proposed that it should be introduced 
simultaneously with open herding, in which the fence was to have played an important 
role. The cost of 93 km of fence was estimated by the government at $75,000, Le., the 
equivalent value of 1,875 reindeer at $40 per carcass. BuHding was in fact started, but 
then, after only a few kilometers, it was abandoned for some reason; since the fence 
was buHt in a valley where it was completely drifted over by snow in winter and thus 
presented no obstacle to the reindeer, the operation, moreover, was senseless. 
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Fig. 4. Government revenues and expenditures, Mackenzie reindeer project, 
1935-75. 
Sourees: Reports of Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa. 
From the very beginning the Canadian government must have been aware that at 
least during its build-up phase, the reindeer project would require significant 
subsidization. In Fig. 4, the government's income and expenditures are compared; the 
true preparatory costs, e.g., the amounts spent on terrain reconnaissance, building 
Reindeer Station, and for the purchase of the first herd, to an amount of $294,000, 
are not included. The progress of the project's development is reflected in the 
expenditures: the establishment of the first Eskimo-owned herds, the repossession of 
the Anderson River herd and the establishment of further small herds; the payment of 
high salaries to the contractors and the intensified use of aircraft in herding since 
1960; in 1964, in addition, the .remnants of Herd 4 had to be repurchased. At the same 
time, in examining these expenditures, one should not overJook the fact that the 
settlement of Reindeer Station was also maintained out of these funds, including the 
supply of electricity and fuel oil. In total, expenditures of $2.6 million can be set 
against an income of barely $0.5 million. If one wants to be malicious, one has to 
recognize that the true costs of production ran at approximately $2.60 per kg of meat. 
With the sale of the herd in March 1974, the government's fmancial 
responsibilities came to an end, apart from the minor costs associated with carrying 
out the annual roundup which devolved upon the govemment. 
6. Out!ook 
The future development of reindeer herding in the Mackenzie Delta will be 
determined by three factors: the potential carrying capacity of the available grazings; 
the absorption capacity of the market; and the number of aggressive people within the 
personnel of the Reindeer Company Limited. 
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On the basis of his preliminary researches A. E. Pro sild (1929) believed that the 
potential carrying capacity of the coastal beIt between the Alaska boundary and Cape 
Parry could be set at 250,000 reindeer. Since the present reindeer reserve covers only 
about one third of that area, it ought to be possible to maintain around 85,000 
animals within the reserve (Hill, 1967). E. Porsild (1936) estimated the potential 
carrying capacity of the reserve (at that time covering 17,094 km2 ) at 25,000 reindeer; 
in 1965, after it had been expanded to 43,361 km2 , Johansson argued on the basis of 
a potential of 30,000 animals, an opinion shared by Scotter (1970), with the 
stipulation that the entire grazing area be utilized, and that controlIed rotation were 
practiced. According to these recent estimates, the theoretical grazing density, 
determined on the basis of the annual grazing area required per reindeer, is 0.6 
reindeer per km2 • Thus it differs only slightly from the value determined for the 
Soviet Union, of 0.7 reindeer per km2 (Andreyev, 1970). When one considers solely 
the winter grazings, representing about 40% of the total pasture, one achieves a figure 
of onIy 1.6 animals per km2 , which would then be considerably lower than the values 
of 7 to 10 reindeer cited by Heile (1966) for northern Finland, and of 10-13 animals 
per km2 cited by Shuncke (1969) for parts ofNorthern Sweden. 
Bissett (1967) has already pointed out the danger to winter grazings from forest 
fires; in 1955 about 2,124 km2 and in 1962 a further 52 km2 were destroyed. The 
intensified encroachment by the expanding stocks of caribou prevents, or at least 
complicates, the inclusion of the eastern half of winter grazings in the controlIed 
pattern of grazing. Added to this is the fact that at present Richards Island is not 
available as a summer grazing area, because the island is heavily overgrazed and because 
the few untouched areas are occupied by oil and gas exploration activities (Nowosad, 
1972). In view of these restrictions it is absolutely essential that the potential carrying 
capacity be determined anew. 
In the only market analysis presented so far, based on a herd size of 30,000 
animals, Hill (1967) distinguished three market regions, where transport factors 
permitted an export potential. The first region included, apart from the delta area, the 
Great Slave Lake area and the settlements along the Mackenzie; in Region 2 he would 
include the remaining parts of the Northwest Territories; and in Region 3 the Yukon 
Territory, alI the provinces, and the foreign export market. However, export to this 
latter market would be possible only after the erection of a slaughterhouse meeting 
strict government regulations, in order to acquire a "Canada Approved" label. For the 
year 1967, Hill calculated on the basis of a given market potential of 140,843 kg per 
year, of which two-thirds would derive from the core area. Within this Region 1, the 
Delta, with a population of 5,000 people and an annual meat consumption of 30 Ibs. 
(13.6 kg) per capita, would alone consume 68,040 kg. By 1977 he estimated a possible 
increase for all three regions, to a minimum of 209,000 kg, and to a maximum, 
assuming greater per capita consumption of 465,000 kg. 
Using the per capita consumption figure determined by HilI for 1967, and taking 
into consideration the most recent population figures for the core area (1975), one 
arrives at a potential demand of 114,000 kg of meat, or 2,073 reindeer; of this demand 
72,422 kg, or 1,317 animals would originate in the delta. In this connection meat sales 
to exploration companies active in the surrounding area are not considered. Of course 
this determination of the demand assurnes that reindeer meat not only can compete on 
the local market with imported beef, but as far as possible would be offered at a 
cheaper price. Since the average price for beef at present is about $1.00 per lb., the 
wholesale price for reindeer meat to the retailer would have tobe in the area of 
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TABLE 2 
Herd Growth and Operations Model 
Initial herd Natural Losses by 
Year-end Year size Calves ' losses straying Slaughtered 
herdsize 
M F M F M F M F M F 
1973 3,480 3,193 1,305 1,305 609 550 418 395 400 6,911 
1974 3,758 3,153 1,414 1,414 658 598 451 397 700 6,935 
1975 4,063 2,872 1,524 1,524 711 592 488 380 700 7,112 
1976 4,388 2,724 1,646 1,646 768 601 527 377 100 600 7,431 
1977 4,639 2,792 1,740 1,740 812 627 557 390 200 800 7,525 
1978 4,810 2,715 1,840 1,840 842 633 577 389 300 700 7,764 
18,938 8,001 5,346 4,500 
Source: Reports of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
Ottawa. 
50-60if per Ib. to give the retailer an adequate margin to cover transport and 
processing costs (the meat is bought from the herd owners in complete carcasses) as 
weIl as a profit margin. Apart from this, a year-round supply of reindeer meat must be 
assured. 
One can work from the assumption that the four herders and the manager of the 
Reindeer Company are in a position to operate a larger herd, and to slaugher 1,300 
reindeer per year. This should be an adequate number to cover the demand in the 
Mackenzie Delta. For reasons of minimizing fIXed costs, the number of herders will 
have to remain limited to four, and yet the major part of the fIXed costs wilI stilI 
consist of wages. Tbe 1973-78 growth model that was conceived prior to the sale of 
the herd (Table 2) would perrnit the culling of around 1,300 animals in the sixth year, 
and thereby at the same time would resuIt in a fmal herd size of around 7,500 
reindeer. A herd of this size can be handled by two herders at a time, in rotation, using 
the open or extensive herding method. A 10% loss from straying, wbich is inevitable 
with this method, has been built into tbis model. Moreover it was also assumed that 
75% of reindeer cows will drop calves annually, and that 20% ofthose calves wUI not 
survive their first year. Losses due to natural causes were taken to be 10% of the adult 
population annually. Total values were based on empirical values, deliberately chosen 
as being relatively low. A planned reindeer operation, with controlled breeding, ideal 
herd composition (90% females: 10% males) and with slaughtering timed to coincide 
with optimal meat quality can certainly not be practiced under present circumstances, 
and hence the herd's optimal productive yield, with constant fIXed costs, cannot be 
achieved. 
It is futile to put forward hypotheses as to the future development of reindeer 
herding in the Mackenzie Delta. Time wHl tell whether the new Eskimo herd owners 
are capable of managing the project successfully. Tbe only sure thing seems to be that 
for the foreseeable future reindeer herding in Canada will be restricted to a limited 
loeal area, and will not be in a position to make a significant contribution toward 
meeting the general demand for meat, within the framework of a large-scale, 
economically effective delivery system, by means of the exploitation of previously 
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little-utilized or unutilized areas. In view of the developments that reindeer herding has 
experienced thus far, Sapper's (1931) forecast must be called in question, at least in 
the case of Canada: according to him the reindeer "will probably make a substantial 
contribution in the future to the sustenance of mankind." 
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